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Development policya b s t r a c t
Despite the vast amount of academic work estimating the impact of natural resources on development,
very little attention has been devoted to the implications of using one type of natural resource measure-
ment over another. This study fills this important gap in two ways. Firstly, it puts forward the biases and
statistical misconceptions associated with different measurements of resource wealth, which have often
led to the wrong classification of resource-poor countries as resource-rich and vice versa. As a result of
the limitations of existing measurements, the discourse around extractives-based development has
tended to lump various countries together, considering them all to be ‘resource-rich’, which is mislead-
ing. Instead, this paper shows that resource wealth and dependence are multifaceted.
Secondly, in contrast to the conventional measurements that have relied on different indicators of
resource wealth in isolation from one another, this study sheds light on the need for a multidimensional
approach to measuring resource endowment. I propose a new indicator, the MINDEX, which weights six
different variables of both resource abundance and dependence across several dimensions (extractives
reserves, production, exports, and government revenues) that relate to the different steps of resource
exploitation chain to harness natural resources for development.
Because of its methodology, the MINDEX can also serve as a diagnostic tool that contributes to identi-
fying some of the extractives-related policy challenges that a given country may face at a given time
(such as illegal commodity smuggling, poor appropriation/taxation of commodity revenues, limited pro-
duction capacity of existing deposits, vulnerability to commodity price fluctuations, and acute commod-
ity dependence). It therefore also responds to the need for a new measure of extractives-based
development to indicate whether a country is moving in the right or wrong direction over time and
has clear relevance for informing resource mobilization dynamics and development strategies.
 2021 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).‘‘It is impossible to escape the impression that people com-
monly use false standards of measurement” — Sigmund Freud,
Civilization and Its Discontents, 1930.1. Introduction
Natural resources have – and continue to – play an important
role in the development (or lack thereof) in many countries. Over
two-thirds of developing countries (and almost 90% of Least Devel-
oped Countries) are still dependent on natural resources (and most
often extractives resources, such as minerals or fossil fuels)(UNCTAD, 2019).1 In addition, 63 out of the 72 most extractive-
dependent countries have increased their dependence on extractives
in the past 15 years (Roe and Dodd, 2018). Natural resources there-
fore continue to play an important role in the dynamics of revenue
mobilization in developing countries. As a result, improving how
we conceptualize, and measure, resource wealth and dependence
is a particularly timely agenda and is of central importance to
informing broader development conversations.
The scholarly interest in the impact of natural resources on eco-
nomic and human development can be traced back to at least the
14th century with Ibn Khaldun’s work (1967 [1377]). Such interest
has been renewed over the past three decades with a plethora ofmodities
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between natural resource wealth and economic development.
Some have found a positive correlation (e.g. Bravo-Ortega & de
Gregorio, 2007; Brunnschweiler, 2008; Davis, 1995; Findlay &
Lundahl, 1999; Pineda & Rodríguez, 2010); some have found a neg-
ative one (e.g. Gylfason, Herbertsson, & Zoega, 1999; Neumayer,
2004; Mehlum, Moene, & Torvik, 2006; Sachs, 1995; Sachs &
Warner, 1997), while others did not find any clear-cut statistical
correlation (e.g. Bond & Fajgenbaum, 2014; James, 2015). The
heterogeneity of results in the literature is partly due to the variety
of methods that have been used to measure natural resource
wealth (and dependence). Nevertheless, despite the vast amount
of academic work that aims to estimate the impact of natural
resources on development, very little attention has been devoted
to the implications of using one type of natural resource measure-
ment over another.
This study fills an important gap in the literature in the quest
for more adequate measurements of natural resource wealth and
notably responds to the growing concern regarding the critical
need to better distinguish resource abundance from resource
dependence (Adebayo, Lashitew, & Werker, 2021; Gylfason,
2011; Lashitew, Ross, & Werker, 2020). Firstly, it puts forward
the biases and statistical misconceptions associated with different
measurements of resource wealth. Such biases have important
implications and raise serious questions on the validity of existing
studies that aim to estimate the impact of natural resource wealth
on development. For instance, the widespread conflation between
resource abundance and resource dependence has led to the wrong
classification of resource-poor countries as resource-rich countries
and vice versa, which raises concerns regarding the true meaning
of the evidence in support of the resource curse theory.
Secondly, most of the literature has relied on different indica-
tors of resource wealth in isolation from one another. Because har-
nessing natural resources for development is a multi-level process,
this article also outlines the need for a multidimensional approach
to measuring resource endowment. It is only recently that schol-
arly work has emphasized that extractive dependence is multidi-
mensional (Hailu & Kipgen, 2017; ICMM, 2020). To take a further
step in highlighting the multidimensionality of both resource
dependence and abundance and its implications for development
strategies, I propose a new measurement: the Multidimensional
Indicator of Extractives-based Development (MINDEX), which
weights different indicators of both resource abundance and
dependence, across several dimensions (such as extractive
reserves, production, exports, and revenues). The MINDEX repre-
sents an effort to go beyond common conceptual flaws when mea-
suring resource wealth and also responds to the call by several
scholars for a new measure of extractive dependence and eco-
nomic diversification over time to indicate whether a country is
moving in the wrong direction (see Lahn & Stevens, 2018;
Mitchell & Stevens, 2008; Stevens, Lahn, & Korooshy, 2015).
Thirdly, this study shows that the discourse around extractives-
based development has tended to group various countries, consid-
ering them all to be resource-rich, which can be misleading
because of the very different ways in which these countries exploit
and depend on extractive resources. By applying the MINDEX, this
article evidences important distinctions amongst economies that
hold/produce/export natural resources and allows to differentiate
at least seven case scenarios that entail considerably different pol-
icy challenges for harnessing extractive resources as a lever to pro-
mote development. The distinctions in the ‘‘shape” of resource
wealth have great implications for the suitability of different eco-
nomic development strategies.
The next section of this paper examines definitions of resource
wealth before reviewing existing methods to measure resource
wealth and their limitations. Section 3 introduces the MINDEX,2
its methodology, as well as the results of its application to several
countries (including through both cross-country and longitudinal
analyses). Section 5 lays out the concluding remarks of this study
and identifies further steps for improving natural resource
measurements.2. Defining and measuring resource abundance
2.1. Classifying natural resources
The first important issue to clarify is what is meant by ‘natural
resources’ in this study. The measurement of what constitutes
resources has evolved with time in the development literature
(Lashitew et al., 2020). The earlier studies on the staples theory
(Innis, 1930; Mackintosh, 1923), as well as the early resource curse
literature (Sachs & Warner, 1995, 1997) treated all primary prod-
ucts (such as fossil fuels, metals and agricultural commodities) as
resources. However, in subsequent research, extracted resources
have often been distinguished from other types of natural
resources because of the particular political and economic circum-
stances associated with them.
A distinction has been made between ‘‘point source” and ‘‘dif-
fused” resources (Isham, Woolcock, Pritchett, & Busby, 2005). It is
considered that mineral resources tend to generate ‘point’ rents,
which exhibit concentrated and capturable revenues (and there-
fore easier to control), rather than ‘diffuse’ rents such as agriculture
(Boschini, Pettersson, & Roine, 2007). Point rents also tend to be
capital intensive and associated with enclave industries since they
generate fewer production and consumption linkages in poor
economies than more ‘diffuse’ resources (Auty & Gelb, 2000:141;
Hirschman, 1981). Hard and energy commodities such as oil and
gas are typical examples of natural resources that are considered
to generate ‘point’ rents. Point and diffuse resources can be distin-
guished by the mode of exploitation but also by their spatial con-
centration (Le Billon, 2001). The former is concentrated in an area
and mostly includes resources exploited by extractive industries
while the latter is more widely spread and mostly includes
resources exploited by productive industries over large areas (i.e.
agriculture, forestry, and fisheries) (ibid.).
However, there are exceptions, and the above-mentioned char-
acterizations appear to be based on generalizations (or observa-
tions) rather than systematic and clear-cut differences. For
instance, artisanal and small-scale mining tend to generate diffuse
resources, while agricultural resources can be concentrated
through state marketing boards, cooperatives, large buyer-
companies. In addition, while it is generally true that hard and
energy minerals tend to have a much higher value in international
commodity markets than most soft commodities, there are some
exceptions, such as low-value minerals (e.g. industrial minerals
such as limestone and silica sand) or saffron (which has a higher
commercial value to weight than gold). While it is often perceived
that commodity price volatility tends to be more accentuated for
mineral commodities than agricultural commodities, it can be also
argued that soft commodity price volatility is further affected by
climatic uncertainties, pathogens, and other risks associated with
farming, which do not necessarily affect hard and energy minerals.
In reality, both agricultural and mineral exhibit outbreaks of
volatility (OECD, 2012).
There are, however, other reasons for singling out hard and
energy commodities. The most important one lies in the fact that
such commodities are non-renewable while soft commodities are
renewable. This difference leads to different dynamics and chal-
lenges in terms of managing those industries in the long run (espe-
cially once those resources are depleted) as well as their political
and developmental effects. For instance, several studies mostly
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1999; Ide, 2015; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004) have sustained that con-
flicts are caused by resource scarcity when it comes to renewable
resources but by resource abundance when it comes to non-
renewable resources.2
The second most important difference lies in the fact that soft
commodities (agriculture, fisheries, etc) can be human-induced.
In contrast, mineral commodities are always ‘‘indigenous” to the
area in which they are found. This is why measuring natural
resource abundance (by including agricultural commodities) in
Chile or Malaysia for instance would neglect the fact that the palm
oil, rubber, salmon, and forestry sectors have been the result of
government-induced diversification. The focus on mineral resource
abundance in the rest of this study is thus justified for these two
reasons.3
2.2. Different existing ways to measure resource abundance and
dependence (and the overlooked distinction between the two)
This section reviews how resource abundance and dependence
have been measured in the literature to date.4 After showing the
limitations of various existing measurements, I argue that no objec-
tive all-encompassing single measurement for resource abundance,
which is why looking at several indicators through a multidimen-
sional approach is necessary.
An important issue when dealing with natural resource mea-
surements consists in finding accurate ways of measuring resource
richness and distinguishing resource abundance from resource
dependence. Distinguishing between resource dependence and
abundance is critical and bears considerable implications for devel-
opment outcomes, as noted by recent work (Adebayo et al., 2021;
Lashitew et al., 2020; Lebdioui, 2019a). Gelb (2010) shows that
studies that focus on resource abundance tend to find positive rela-
tionship with economic growth, and those focusing on resource
dependence tend to find a negative relationship. Lashitew et al.
(2020) further found that more resource-dependent countries
appear to perform worse on measures of human capital and intel-
lectual capital, whereas resource-abundant countries perform bet-
ter on public capital and human capital accumulation as well as
broader competitive capabilities.5 A proper elaboration of the impli-
cations of the distinction between resource abundance and depen-
dence, which are subjective and complex concepts, remains a key
gap in the literature on the impact of natural resources on
development.
Some of the most influential studies on the resource curse have
been characterized by statistical misconceptions. For instance, the
negative correlation between economic growth and natural
resource wealth found in Sachs and Warner (1997) relies on mea-
surements of the share of resources output/exports out of total
output/exports. This measurement is misleading because it reflects
resource dependence rather than resource abundance.6 Several
studies (see Brunnschweiler & Bulte, 2006; Di John, 2011; Gelb,2 Such argument has been criticized in Le Billon (2001) and Cramer (2002).
3 In this paper, I will use the terms commodities, extractives, and resources
interchangeably.
4 See Hailu and Kipgen (2017) for a similar review of commonmeasures of resource
dependence.
5 For instance, Lashitew et al. (2020) explain that the differences between Canada
and the Republic of Congo can be explained by differences in resources dependence
rather than resource wealth. The two countries have the same levels of natural
resource endowment (in terms of resource rents per capita) but Canada’s GDP is
nearly eight times higher than that of the Republic of Congo because it has managed
to diversify away from natural resources and develop a highly productive non-
resource sector while the Republic of Congo has failed to do so (ibid.).
6 Other studies have used similar measures of resource wealth that rely on the
share of primary exports in GDP/GNP/Exports (e.g. Boschini et al., 2007; Mehlum
et al., 2006; Havranek, Horvath, & Zeynalov, 2016).
3
2010) have indeed pointed out the endogeneity between resource
dependence and growth (the two variables used in Sachs &
Warner, 1997), which suggests that the poor economic performance
in many LDCs is more likely to be due to resource dependence than
abundance. In particular, this methodological choice has two impor-
tant implications: First, it misclassifies (as resource-rich) countries
that are resource-poor but export little else than the few commodi-
ties they have (because they have little other products to export to
foreign markets, which is a characteristic of an underdeveloped
economy). For instance, some countries, such as Chad and Mali,
may have few mineral resources but depend on those few for the
bulk of their export earnings (Gylfason, 2011:10). Second, the statis-
tical confusion between resource dependence and abundance leads
to a selection bias that ignores successful resource-based develop-
ment experiences. In historical terms, several now-industrialized
resource-rich countries, such as the United States, Canada, Australia,
Sweden, the Netherlands, and Malaysia, began as resource-based
economies but have managed to add value to their natural resources
and diversify their economy. Despite being resource-rich, such coun-
tries do not by definition qualify as resource-dependent anymore.
In a similar perspective, Ross (2001) investigates whether oil
wealth has an impact on democracy but uses indicators of oil reli-
ance rather than oil abundance. The implications of this method-
ological distinction are considerable and are reflected in Fig. 1. In
the index of oil reliance in Ross (2001), which is based on data
for the year 1995, Nigeria ranks 4th and precedes Yemen (ranked
7th) and Norway (ranked 16th). However, the relative position of
these three countries is almost reversed by using an indicator of
oil abundance in absolute terms (such as oil exports in USD) rather
than oil reliance. Norway’s oil exports were in fact 17 times higher
than Yemen’s in 1995, despite Yemen featuring higher levels of oil
dependence than Norway. Such divergence opens important ques-
tions on how the impact of natural resources on various indicators
of development has been estimated in the scientific literature to
date.
Several scholars have discussed and defined the difference
between resource abundance and resource dependence. Gylfason
(2011:10) provides an interesting way of distinguishing resource
abundance from resource dependence, whereby abundance relates
to the amount of natural capital that a country has at its disposal
(i.e. mineral deposits, oil fields, forests, or farmland), while depen-
dence relates to the extent to which the nation in question depends
on these natural resources for its livelihood. Similarly, Hailu and
Kipgen (2017) argue that resource abundance refers to resource
endowments or stocks, which to a large extent are endogenously
determined, while resource dependence refers to the importance
of the resource sector to an economy in generating tax revenues,
foreign exchange, growth, and employment. Thus, resource depen-
dence becomes applicable once extraction takes place while being
resource-abundant does not necessarily imply extraction of those
resources (ibid.). Nevertheless, it could be argued that the distinc-
tion between abundance and dependence goes beyond the differ-
ence between resource availability and resource exploitation
because a country could exploit its natural capital without neces-
sarily depending on it as it may also have alternative ways of sus-
taining its livelihoods.
There are further concerns that arise when defining and mea-
suring resource dependence. A country is commonly considered
resource-dependent when natural resources constitute the bulk
of this country’s export basket or government revenues. However,
should we distinguish mono-resource exporters from multi-
resource exporters (countries that depend on several types of nat-
ural resources)? In other words, should we consider multi-resource
exporting countries (such as Chile, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, or South Africa) to be as resource-dependent as mono-
resource exporters (Algeria, Angola, or Venezuela) that feature
Fig. 1. Divergent trends in terms of oil reliance and abundance in selected countries in 1995. Source: UN Comtrade (2019).
7 Gelb, Kaiser and Vinuela (2012) raise the interesting question of how much does
it cost to find new reserves relative to the value of discoveries and bring together
estimates of the value of imputed discovery and of the cost of exploration, which has
implications for how natural resource wealth and discoveries should be valued. The
World Bank’s resource rents data imputes the cost of exploration.
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In such a scenario, it can be argued that if the prices of the different
natural resources that a country is endowed with are uncorrelated,
one could regard such a country to be less dependent than a mono-
resource exporting country as the former is likely to experience
less commodity price fluctuation-induced macroeconomic vulner-
ability than the latter.
Given the complexity of measuring resource dependence, and
its endogeneity with developmental outcomes, should we instead
use indicators of resource exports in absolute terms to understand
the impact of natural resources on development? Resource exports
by country is also an imperfect indicator of resource wealth for at
least three reasons:
Firstly, such variable does not distinguish countries that are
‘‘genuine” resource exporters from countries that are resource-
poor but re-export commodities (after some basic degrees of pro-
cessing or after they have been illegally smuggled into the coun-
try). For instance, the Chatham House Resource Trade Database
(CHRTD) enables to rank countries according to the level of
resource exports in any given year. Unsurprisingly, resource-poor
countries such as Germany, Switzerland, Hong Kong, or Singapore
often rank amongst the top resource exporters in the world.
Secondly, resource exports do not equate to resource wealth
because of the variations in the cost of production of natural
resources. The cost of production can vary across geographies even
for the same commodity. For instance, the total cost for producing
an oil barrel in recent years has been about USD9 for Iran and Saudi
Arabia, in comparison to USD44 in the United Kingdom, USD29 in
Nigeria, and USD28 for Venezuela (Wall Street Journal, 2016).
Could we therefore legitimately consider that such countries are
equally resource-rich if the value of their oil exports is compara-
ble? Such consideration also means that if commodity prices go
below the value of the commodity production costs in a given
country, it can be considered that this country’s resource wealth
has become a stranded asset (and should therefore be valued dif-
ferently). Naturally, the costs of production of a given commodity
are not static over time and depend on technological progress.
Nevertheless, how we value a country’s resource wealth over time
should reflect such considerations.
Thirdly, the fact that two countries are producing or exporting
the same volume of minerals does not mean that they are equally
resource-rich, as their resulting wealth will depend on the cost of
extraction but also on how many people will share the benefits
of such wealth (Lahn & Stevens, 2018). It can be argued that it
would not be accurate to consider that a country such as Nigeria
is more resource-rich than Norway based on the national value4
of resource rents generated in a given year because such rents have
to be shared between 190million people in Nigeria and only five
million in Norway. By adjusting resource rents to population size,
Norway’s resource rents per capita in 2016 are 40 times higher
than Nigeria’s!
In that perspective, Lederman and Maloney (2007) measured
resource abundance by using net resource exports per capita and
concluded that Norway, New Zealand, Canada, Finland, and Aus-
tralia ranked as the most resource-intensive economies rather than
economies such as the DRC and Papua New Guinea in the Sachs
(1995) study. This measurement appears to be a much better
reflection of resource abundance then than the share of natural
resources in GDP/exports. Nevertheless, it remains imperfect for
the first two reasons discussed above.
It is also possible to look at indicators other than exports. For
instance, resource abundance could also be measured in terms of
the value of production (see Leamer, 1984; Moroney, 1975); the
size of resource revenues (see IMF, 2012b; Matsen & Torvik,
2005); or resource rents (see Cammett, Diwan, Richards, &
Waterbury, 2015; Chang & Lebdioui, 2020; Collier & Hoeffler,
2009; Chauvet & Collier, 2008; International Monetary Fund,
2012b). Resource rents per capita are perhaps one of the most
accurate indicators of resource wealth available given that such
measurement considers the difference between the value of com-
modity production at world prices and total costs of production.7
Indeed, in light of the some of above-mentioned methodological lim-
itations, recent studies have started to use indicators of resource
abundance by calculating resource revenues or rents per capita
(e.g., Alexeev & Conrad, 2009; Ross, 2017; Chang & Lebdioui,
2020). However, measurements that focus on resource rents or rev-
enues may misclassify countries with large mining sectors such as
Madagascar (ilmenite) as resource-poor because of a very low
resource rent of the commodity (the market price of ilmenite is only
marginally above its cost of extraction in Madagascar) (Bond &
Fajgenbaum, 2014:126). In those cases, focusing on resource rents
may misrepresent the importance of extractive sectors for the
domestic economy.
Other studies have measured resource abundance by using indi-
cators of physical resource endowment, by comparing resource
reserves or deposits per square kilometer across regions (See
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Bank has also developed a measure of natural capital that includes
estimates for subsoil assets. Using this measure, Brunnschweiler
and Bulte (2008) find that the most resource-rich countries are
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Norway.
Despite its usefulness, resource reserve data faces important
limitations. Firstly, the data available on extractives reserves by
country is related to a country’s technological level. As a result,
relying on this indicator alone could misrepresent the true
resource wealth of nations but also give uneven weighting to the
resource wealth of more advanced economies where a higher num-
ber of geological explorations may have been conducted. For
instance, several studies have highlighted that there has been far
less geological exploration in Sub-Saharan Africa than in the rest
of the world (Collier, 2011; Gelb et al. 2012), which is why the
Wealth of Nations database (World Bank, 2010) shows that the
value of known subsoil assets per square kilometre of Sub-
Saharan Africa is barely one fourth of that for high-income coun-
tries. Secondly, it is important to distinguish extractable from
non-extractable resource reserves. In contrast to most studies
within political science and economics, geologists generally do
not think of endowments as the value of current production and
tend to focus on geological abundance as well as quality, and tech-
nical considerations such as extractability of metal from ore (Davis,
2010). The United Nations even has its own definitions that distin-
guish resource deposits on extractability grounds: Reserves are
quantities that are relatively more certain geologically and more
likely to be economic to extract, while resources are less geologi-
cally certain and may never be economically extracted.8
While many indicators have been used to measure resource
abundance, both absolute terms and relative terms (as a share of
GDP or total exports for instance), there are great implications of
relying on one measurement over another. Table 1 ranks the top
12 countries across six indicators of both resource abundance
and dependence. Only 3 countries (Brunei, Kuwait, and Saudi Ara-
bia) feature in the rankings for each of the six indicators (and only
one other country, the UAE, features in the top 12 for at least four
indicators out of six). This shows that using different indicators
may have a great influence on study results.2.3. Multidimensional approaches to measure resource wealth and
dependence
As shown in the previous section, existing measurements have
mostly relied on resource measurements in isolation from one
another. There is no objective all-encompassing single measure-
ment for resource abundance, which is why it is important to look
at several indicators. A country can be dependent on extractive
resources as a source of gross national income, exports, employ-
ment, and inputs for other industries. Each of these types of depen-
dence has different implications. Resource dependence and
exposure are difficult to measure when analyzing individual
aspects of dependence in isolation (Le Billon & Good, 2016).
Hailu and Kipgen (2017) further argue that understanding the type
of dependence on non-renewable resources helps craft the right
policies for diversification.98 However, there is no standardization of these categorizations, with several
nations deriving their own definitions (e.g. JORC in Australia, CIMVal in Canada,
SAMVal in South Africa) (Davis, 2010).
9 They show that the shares of export earnings from the extractive sectors in
Zambia and Norway are similar (76 percent and 74 percent respectively), but the two
countries have vastly different levels of resource dependence based on economic
development, technological capabilities, and revenue diversification. The two coun-
tries consequently have different levels of exposure to commodity busts, which
suggests that the share of extractives in total exports is not, in and of itself, sufficient
to judge the degree of extractive dependency of an economy (ibid.)
5
The combination of several indicators of resource wealth (such
as resource production, exports, rents, and government revenues)
can consequently offer useful insights that single indicators cannot
grasp on their own. The recognition that extractive dependence is
multidimensional was recently emphasized by scholarly work on
the Extractives Dependence Index (Hailu & Kipgen, 2017) and the
Mining Contribution Index (ICMM, 2020). The Extractives Depen-
dence Index (EDI) is a measure to monitor a country’s dependence
on the extraction of oil, gas, and mineral resources. It measures the
share of export earnings from extractives; their share of revenue in
total revenue; and their value-added in GDP. The resulting com-
posite index is used to rank countries through values ranging from
0 to 100, with 100 being the highest dependence score. They find
that Iraq, Libya, Equatorial Guinea have the highest EDI values,
while the Philippines, Sao Tome and Principe, and the UK had the
lowest extractive dependency scores.
Very recently, another indicator, the Mining Contribution Index
(MCI), developed by the International Council on Mining and
Metals (ICMM, 2020), synthesized into a single number three vari-
ables, namely the share of the mining sector’s contribution to
exports; to GDP; and the increase/decrease in mineral export con-
tribution over 2005–2010. The three variables are weighted
equally at 1/3, summed up, and multiplied by 100.
The two methods reviewed above represent laudable efforts to
capture the several dimensions of resource dependence but may
not suffice to capture the multidimensionality of both resource
wealth and dependence simultaneously. Building on these valuable
works, I propose a new index, the Multidimensional Indicator for
Extractives-based (MINDEX), which takes one step further by: (i)
including variables of resource abundance in both relative and
absolute terms (rather than in relative terms alone); (ii) visualizing
the data into radar charts to avoid the synthesis into single num-
bers, which may shadow important variation in the distribution
of value across different variables; (iii) including all types of
extractive resources (rather than mining alone, although the type
of commodity can be further isolated). As a result, the MINDEX
may be the most comprehensive effort so far to capture the multi-
dimensionality of resource abundance and dependence.3. Resource abundance comes in several shapes: the MINDEX
3.1. Overview and objectives
Harnessing natural resources for development is a multi-level
process and the types of variables that we choose to measure
resource abundance reflect different aspects of the natural
resource management chain. As a result, in this section, I show
how relying on several indicators simultaneously may be a useful
way to identify specific developmental challenges a resource-rich
country faces. The Multidimensional Indicator for Extractives-
based (MINDEX) builds on recent work on multidimensional
indices to provide a better picture of the multidimensionality of
resource wealth and dependence. It weights six different indicators
on a scale of 0 to 1. Those six indicators are:
- The share of extractives in total exports (%)
- Extractives exports (in USD per capita)
- Extractives rents (in USD per capita)
- Government revenues from extractives (USD per capita)
- The share of extractives in total government revenues (%)
- Extractives reserves (USD per capita)
Four of these indicators are measures of ‘‘resource abundance”
(extractives exports, rents, reserves, and government revenues)
while the remaining two are measures of resource dependence
Table 1
Countries ranked across various indicators of extractive abundance and dependence.
Extractive exports Extractive exports Extractive reserves Extractive rents Extractive revenues Extractive revenues
Ranking/Units USD per capita % USD per capita USD per capita USD per capita %
1 Qatar Angola Venezuela Qatar Kuwait* Iraq
2 Kuwait* Venezuela Kuwait* Kuwait* Brunei* Brunei*
3 Brunei* Algeria Botswana UAE Qatar Eq. Guinea
4 Norway Qatar Saudi Arabia* Saudi Arabia* UAE Saudi Arabia*
5 Singapore Kuwait* Australia Brunei* Libya Kuwait*
6 UAE Azerbaijan Brunei* Oman Norway Timor-Leste
7 Oman Brunei* Canada Norway Saudi Arabia* Angola
8 Saudi Arabia* Botswana South Africa Eq. Guinea Oman Congo, Rep.
9 Australia Nigeria Iran Australia Bahrain Azerbaijan
10 Canada Kazakhstan UAE Iraq Eq. Guinea UAE
11 Kazakhstan Saudi Arabia* Guyana Trinidad and Tobago Trinidad and Tobago Nigeria
12 Botswana Zambia Norway Libya Iraq Yemen
Source: MINDEX database.
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revenues).
These indicators were also selected because they all represent
different dimensions of extractive activities. Government revenues
from extractives relate to the fiscal linkages arising out of extrac-
tives, which provides information on the State’s ability to mobilise
revenues in the broader development context. Relatedly, the share
of extractives in government revenues reflects the extent to which
governments depend on extractive activities for their fiscal rev-
enues, which matters because a country’s vulnerability to com-
modity price volatility is directly related to its fiscal dependence
on commodities (Hailu & Kipgen, 2017). A large body of literature
has addressed the development implications of fiscal dependence
on extractives (e.g. Lane & Tornell, 1996; Mehlum et al., 2006;
Sala-i-Martin & Subramanian, 2013).
The indicator of resource rents also reflects the revenue dimen-
sion while accounting for the costs of production (as explained in
footnote 10). Measures of resource exports can indicate how much
foreign exchange revenues a country generates from the resource
sector, and the degree of country’s dependence on the extractive sec-
tor to generate foreign exchange revenues, which is important
because economic diversification requires the creation of additional
sources of foreign exchange (outside the extractive sector). There is a
large body of literature on the developmental impact of extractive
dependence and the role of export diversification as an engine of
structural change and economic development (e.g. Agosin, 2009;
Cadot, Carrère, & Strauss-Kahn, 2011; Cherif, Hasanov, & Wang,
2018; Hausmann, Hwang, & Rodrik, 2007; Lebdioui, 2019a, 2019b).
The last indicator, namely extractives reserves, reflects the
quantity and value of resources are available to extract, as well
as exhaustibility concerns. Such considerations matter in the con-
text of development and diversification strategies because the
desirability of building production linkages around a commodity
depends on the exhaustibility of its reserves (Lebdioui, 2019a). If
countries run out of oil or copper, they might need to import it
to keep operating related industries (ibid.). The size of extractive
reserves, therefore, has an important influence in terms of the
impact of forward linkages on extractive dependence because it
influences the ability of domestic downstream industries to reach
economies of scale, which is important for their long-term compet-
itiveness and their impact on economic diversification (Lebdioui &
Bilek, 2021).
Those six indicators also reflect the different steps of the
resource revenue management policy chain to translate extracted10 An indicator of developmental outcomes (such as the HDI) could be added in
future updates of the MINDEX to consider the last step of the resource revenue
management chain, which is investing for human development.
6
commodities into developmental assets. Such steps are common
across various policy frameworks of natural resource management
according to which the conversion of extractive resources into
developmental outcomes follows a sequence of steps, which
includes the discovery of natural resources, their production, the
appropriation of extractives revenues, and their investment for
developmental purposes (see Table 2).
As such, the MINDEX can serve as a diagnostic tool to assess the
performance of a given country across the series of steps of the
resource management policy chain (whether it is limited produc-
tion compared to proven reserves, poor appropriation of revenues,
or an insufficiently diversified economy reflecting the poor invest-
ments of resource revenues for structural transformation).10 The
possibility of identifying policy challenges through the MINDEX
is reflected by the seven case scenarios identified in Table 3.3.2. Methodology
The development and application of the MINDEX have faced
several methodological challenges such as issues of data availabil-
ity and comparability. Such issues have been addressed through
the establishment of a scoring system and appropriate benchmarks
for each indicator (see Table 4). The value of extractives exports,
rents, reserves, and revenues are expressed in USD (constant)
and in per capita terms. Per capita measurements are a better
reflection of resource abundance than national measurements, as
discussed earlier in Section 2.11
The methodological choices and data sources underlying this
scoring system are further explained in the following subsections
for each of the indicators. Despite its imperfections, such method-
ology represents the best effort to date to capture the multidimen-
sionality of resource abundance.3.2.1. Resource exports
Data on resource exports was collected from UN Comtrade and
WTO databases. Table 5 indicates the commodity codes that have
been used to isolate extractive resources using the Standard Inter-
national Trade Classification (SITC), in line with the definition and
classification of extractive resources that are provided in
Section 1.2.1.
The use of measurements of real GDP (in constant 2010 USD) is
preferred over nominal GDP (in current USD) to remove the effects
of inflation over time and more accurately reflect changes in pro-
duction volume and commodity prices. Nevertheless, export data
from UN Comtrade and WTO databases is expressed in nominal11 The wealth of countries that are holding/producing/exporting the same volume of
extractives depends on how many people will share the benefits of such wealth.
Table 2
Different steps of the resource revenue management policy chain.
Chang (2007) Collier &
Laroche
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A. Lebdioui World Development 147 (2021) 105633prices rather than real prices. I have therefore used the values of
each years’ consumer price index (accessible in theWorld Develop-
ment Indicators database) to deflate the export data values. The
use of real prices rather than nominal prices also enables better
comparability over time.
The scoring criteria for resource exports is based on a continu-
ous variable using an exponential function for resource exports per
capita values. This function corresponds with the distribution of
average resource exports per capita values by country. The corre-
sponding exponential equation is f(x) = 35.121e0.594x.3.2.2. Resource rents
The value of extractive rents was calculated by using data from
the World Development Indicators, which feature the share of var-
ious types of natural resource rents as a share of GDP. To obtain
absolute values in per capita terms for each year, the sum of the
share of extractives rents (namely oil, mineral, and coal rents,
using the WDI terminology) as a share of GDP was multiplied by
the value of GDP (in constant 2010 USD), and divided by the pop-
ulation size recorded for that year.
The scoring benchmarks differ between resource rents and
resource exports because the value of resource rents does not
include the cost of resource production, unlike resource export val-
ues (World Bank, 2019). Based on my calculations, resource
exports are on average twice (2.01) as high as resource rents over
the period 1997–2010. The scoring criteria (see Table 4) for
resource rents and exports take this ratio into account.12 Interestingly, countries where private firms dominate oil production appear
among the world’s top tax collectors, while similarly resource-rich countries that rely
on national petroleum companies appear among the worst tax collectors (Pritchard
et al., 2018).3.2.3. Government revenues
Data availability has always been an issue whenmeasuring gov-
ernment resource revenues (Prichard, Salardi, & Segal, 2018). For-
tunately, the most recent update of the International Centre for
Tax and Development (ICTD) database has included isolated data
on resource revenues, which represents both taxes from resource
revenues and non-tax resource revenues (such as royalties, divi-
dends, etc). Nevertheless, the data is still missing for several coun-
tries and time periods. In order to complete this database, I have
used data from the resource revenue dataset published by the Nat-
ural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI) and from direct govern-
mental sources (such as government statistics offices and central
banks).
In the ICTD database, tax revenues are expressed as a percent-
age of GDP. To obtain absolute values per capita, I have converted7
such values by multiplying them by the corresponding GDP per
capita (in constant 2010 USD) for each country.
Besides data availability concerns, another issue is to define
what counts as government revenues. Should profits that are
retained by SOEs (such as national oil companies) be taken into
account? For instance, many SOEs have more than purely commer-
cial missions but also spend their revenues for social purposes
(such as spending on fuel subsidies by Petronas, etc).12 Because
of the lack of data on SOEs’ profits and spending patterns, it would
be too difficult to include profit retains by SOEs in the analysis,
which consequently only focuses on resource revenues paid to the
central government.
Another key concern is to distinguish federal revenues from
subnational revenues. In some countries (such as the USA or
Malaysia) resource revenues do not only accrue to the central gov-
ernment but also provincial governments. As a result, US govern-
ment resource revenues may appear as low, when in fact most
resource revenues accrue to state governments. The ICTD database
only includes revenues to the central government. Future updates
of the MINDEX will attempt to include revenues at the subnational
level.
Lastly, the remaining concern has been the establishment of an
appropriate benchmark for scoring resource revenues. The lack of
data on government fiscal revenues for many countries renders
international comparisons a difficult task. As a result, how can
we judge whether a government’s resource revenues are truly high
or low? The solution found has consisted of using resource rents
values as a baseline. Evidence suggests that on average, govern-
ments should capture about two-thirds of resource rents. While
fiscal regimes for extractive industries vary greatly, the IMF
(2012a) finds that governments should retain around 40–60% of
rents in the mining sector and around 65–85% of rents in the
hydrocarbons sector. Fiscal regimes that raise less than these
benchmark averages may be cause for concern or regret (ibid.). It
is consequently reasonable to assume that across extractive activ-
ities, the government should receive about 60% of the value of
resource rents, which is why I have imposed threshold values
based on a government resource revenues/ resource rents ratio of
0.6 in the scoring criteria (see Table 4). While this method suffers
from limitations due to the variety of fiscal regimes across different
Table 3
Seven case scenarios and ‘shapes’ of resource endowment.
Case Scenario Description and interpretations
‘Resource-rich and dependent’:
All six indicators are high
The country is both resource-abundant and resource-dependent.
‘Internal resource wealth’:
Resource production is high but exports are low
High domestic consumption of that mineral as a finished product (consumption of oil for electricity
generation in Saudi Arabia) or as inputs for value-added activities (e.g. oil used for petrochemical
production in the United States) or illegal smuggling of commodities.
‘Below-ground resource wealth’:
Resource reserves are high but production/rents are low
Issue of investment attractiveness in resource activities (due to a poor business climate); limited
domestic infrastructure and capabilities to extract minerals; political issues such as an embargo (as
in oil-rich Iran and manganese-rich Cuba); local conflict (e.g. Libya) restraining resource production
and exports; or decisions to leave extractives in the ground for environmental reasons.
‘Unappropriated resource wealth’:
High levels of resource production (or resource rents) but low government revenues from resource
exploitation.
The country faces issues of appropriation of resource revenues and possible insufficient taxation on
mineral production/exports.
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Table 3 (continued)
Case Scenario Description and interpretations
Resource-poor but resource-dependent:
Resource production, exports, and reserves are low but the share of minerals in total exports and
government revenues are high (vertical stretch).
The country is resource-poor but is highly resource-dependent
‘Resource-abundance without dependence’:
In contrast to case 4, mineral production, exports and reserves are high but the share of minerals in total
exports and government revenues are low (horizontal stretch).
The country is resource-rich but has a diversified economy.
The ‘Swiss paradox’:
Extractives exports are high, but mineral rents and reserves are low.
The country is resource-poor but is a re-exporter of imported commodities in crude form or after
some processing (India and Israel with diamonds; Switzerland and UAE with gold; Singapore with
unrefined petroleum and fuel); or after the illegal smuggling of commodities into the country (e.g.
Congo or Liberia with diamonds respectively smuggled from DRC and Sierra Leone).
EXP%: Share of extractives in total exports.
EXPPC Extractives exports (in USD per capita).
REVPC: Government revenues from extractives (in USD, per capita).
REV%: The share of extractives in government revenues.
RENTS: Extractives rents (in USD per capita).
RESRV: Extractives reserves (in USD per capita).
A. Lebdioui World Development 147 (2021) 105633types of extractive sectors, it is useful as it enables to directly com-
pare government resource revenues with resource rents for the
same year.3.2.4. Share of extractives in total exports and total revenues
Scoring the share of extractive resources in total exports and
total fiscal revenues has been relatively straightforward given that
the value of these two indicators (both expressed in percentages)
was linearly converted into the scores (which range from 0 to 1).
Both indicators were calculated using the same sources and
methodology as described in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.3.9
3.2.5. Resource reserves
Measuring and comparing extractives reserves is a daunting
task because of the uneven availability of data across countries
and types of commodities. Beyond data availability, another
important consideration is data comparability. Firstly, it is difficult
to distinguish extractive reserves/deposits from extractive
resources that are more difficult to extract. Secondly, commodity
reserve data, when accessible, tends to be measured in weight
(metric ton, ounce, barrels, or else) rather than value, which ren-
ders difficult the task of comparing countries that sit on different
types of extractives resources. To enable comparability across com-
modities (because an ounce of gold does not have the same value
as an ounce of limestone) and across the various indicators of the
Table 4
















1 100% 100% >13,000 >6,500 >170,000 >3900
0.9 90% 90% Between 7,500 and 13,000 Between 3750 and 6,500 Between 170,000 and 90,000 Between 3900 and 2250
0.8 80% 80% Between 4,000 and 7500 Between 2000 and 3750 Between 90,000 and 50,000 Between 2250 and 1200
0.7 70% 70% Between 2,500 and 4000 Between 1250 and 2000 Between 50,000 and 25,000 Between 1200 and 750
0.6 60% 60% Between 1000 and 2500 Between 500 and 1250 Between 25,000 and 18,000 Between 750 and 300
0.5 50% 50% Between 750 and 1000 Between 375 and 500 Between 18,000 and 10,000 Between 300 and 225
0.4 40% 40% Between 500 and 750 Between 250 and 375 Between 10,000 and 5000 Between 225 and 150
0.3 30% 30% Between 250 and 500 Between 125 and 250 Between 5000 and 2000 Between 150 and 75
0.2 20% 20% Between 100 and 250 Between 50 and 125 Between 2000 and 1000 Between 75 and 30
0.1 10% 10% Between 50 and 100 Between 25 and 50 Between 1000 and 500 Between 30 and 15
0.0 0% 0% <50 < 25 Below 500 < 15
Table 5




28 Metalliferous ores and metal scrap
3 Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials
68 Non-ferrous metals
667.2 Diamonds (other than sorted industrial diamonds), whether or
not worked, but not mounted or set
667.3 Precious stones (other than diamonds) and semiprecious
stones, whether or not worked or graded but not strung,
mounted or set; ungraded precious stones (other than
diamonds) and semiprecious stones, temporarily strung for
convenience of transport
97 Gold (non-monetary)
19 Trade data using the Harmonised System (HS) of commodity classification has
been used to gather data on countries for which SITC data is not available.
A. Lebdioui World Development 147 (2021) 105633MINDEX (such as resource exports, rents, revenues, which are all
measured by value), commodity reserves data has been converted
into USD per capita. This conversion has been conducted by using
averaged commodity prices (for a given commodity) on a yearly
basis. This method was chosen after considering several alterna-
tives, including using averaged commodity prices for a longer per-
iod or using the share of global commodity reserves that a country
holds as scoring criteria. However, both alternative measurements
have limitations. For instance, using average prices for a longer-
term period would not reflect immediate changes (or the direction
of changes) in terms of the commodity prices/value of commodity
reserves. Using the share of global reserves would also not allow
comparability across different types of commodities.
Data on yearly prices by commodity was extracted from IMF,
UNCTAD, IndexMundi, and the Federal Reserve of St Louis datasets.
Data on commodity reserves was collected from US geological sur-
veys, the CIA factbook, EITI reports, and governmental sources.13
As a result of this methodology, variations in the score of
extractives reserves across years can be interpreted in two ways:
Changes can either reflect fluctuations in commodity prices, or
changes in the volume of commodity deposits (either through their
exhaustion or discovery). The strength of this method (compared
to averaging commodity prices over a longer time period or using
a reference year in terms of commodity prices) is that that it would
more accurately reflect the evolution of the value of given com-
modities. This methodology also reflects more accurately the risk13 The commodities that have been included in this first round of data collection on
extractive reserves by country include: crude oil, copper, diamonds, gold, iron ore,
natural gas, lithium, bauxite, phosphate, cobalt, uranium, and zinc.
10of stranded assets for commodities whose values depreciate over
time.
The scoring criteria for resource reserves is based on a continu-
ous variable using an exponential function. The exponential equa-
tion is: f(x) = 352.73e0.62x.3.3. Application and results14
3.3.1. Cross-country analysis
Several key observations can be drawn from the cross-country
analysis in Fig. 2. First of all, it is possible to match each country
with at least one of the seven case scenarios identified in Table 3,
which confirms the notion that extractive resource wealth and
dependence are multifaceted. For instance, the MINDEX of coun-
tries such as Algeria and Ecuador corresponds to case 1; Malaysia
features a case 6; Singapore features a case 7; while Chad and
Nigeria feature a case 5.
Secondly, it is interesting to note that some of the cases are
hybrids, either because they simultaneously feature several case
scenarios (e.g. DRC), or because they are in the transition between
two cases (e.g. Nigeria). For instance, the MINDEX for both the DRC
and Burkina Faso corresponds to a hybrid between cases 3 and 4,
due to the small size of government resource revenues and
resource exports despite the country’s reliance on mining exports
and the availability of resource deposits. Such a result reveals a
lack of capabilities to extract minerals (due to a lack of investments
or the presence of conflicts) but also potentially the illegal smug-
gling of commodities, which would explain why so little govern-
ment revenues, exports, and rents have been recorded in these
two countries. Such assessment is confirmed by existing analyses.
In the context of Burkina Faso, EITI (2016) revealed that only 37 of
the certified 63 trading houses declared their revenues to the Office
of Mines and Geology. EITI (2016:1) also reported that: ‘‘the
declared production from artisanal mining was 0.5 tons in 2013,
but undeclared production was estimated as at least 8.8 tons
[. . .] and slips through the country’s borders undetected. In 2013,
the NGO [the Berne Declaration] reported that approximately
seven tons of gold left the country undeclared and was exported
to Switzerland via Togo.”
The DRC’s MINDEX, revealing possible issues of appropriation of
resource revenues and insufficient taxation on mineral produc-
tion/exports, is also consistent with existing accounts of its mining
sector: ‘‘In the DRC, the picture in mining taxation is more difficult
to quantify since a large part of the mining is undertaken by nearly
two-million informal workers, and because most of the mining14 See Appendix A for details on each country data and measurements.
Fig. 2. Application of the MINDEX to selected countries (year 2010). EXP%: Share of extractives in total exports; EXPPC Extractives exports (in USD per capita); REVPC:
Government revenues from extractives (in USD, per capita); REV%: The share of extractives in government revenues; RENTS: Extractives rents (in USD per capita); RESRV:
Extractives reserves (in USD per capita). The year 2010 was chosen over more recent years to present accentuated shapes (before the commodity price drop in 2014). A
comparison between 2010 and more recent years is found in Fig. 4.
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Fig. 2 (continued)
A. Lebdioui World Development 147 (2021) 105633contracts of even the large companies are secret.” (Di John,
2010:19).
Other analyses also evidence the smuggling of commodities
from DRC to its neighbouring countries. Smillie (2007:115) shows
that in the late 1990s and 2000s, when the DRC was undergoing
conflict, Belgium imported several hundred USD million worths
of diamonds from Congo-Brazzaville. However, in 1999, when
the political situation was more stable in the DRC, Belgium
imported only USD14.4 million worth of diamonds from Brazzav-
ille, and there was growth in imports from the DRC. 1515 Another example is provided by the case of Sierra Leone, where there were no
government-supervised diamond exports from the 1970s to 1999, while across the
border in Liberia, a country with a very low diamond production of its own, diamond
exports were thriving (Smillie, 2007). Diamonds were being simply smuggled across
the river to Brazzaville (ibid.).
12Nevertheless, comparing fluctuations in commodity exports
does not suffice to detect commodity smuggling (since such fluctu-
ations can be explained by several factors, including production
increases, the discovery of deposits, and so on). Instead, such irreg-
ularities can be detected more effectively and systematically by
comparing changes in commodity exports with changes in other
variables, as enabled through the MINDEX. Fig. 3 and Table 6 show
that the jump in diamond exports in Congo (Brazzaville) between
1976 and 1980 (from USD1.2 million to almost USD40 million)
has not been accompanied by an increase in diamond rents (ex-
tractive rents had even declined in that period). As a result of its
multidimensional and holistic approach to resource measurement,
the MINDEX can therefore be used as a diagnostic tool to detect (or
at least suspect) illegal commodity smuggling by identifying
abnormal spikes/drops in commodity exports in relation to com-
modity rents.
Fig. 3. Rep. of Congo (1980). Case 7.
Table 6
Key statistics on diamond exploitation in Rep. of Congo (Brazzaville).
Key Variables 1976 1980
Diamond exports (%) 0% 4%
Diamond exports (USD per capita) 3.08 56.24
Diamond revenues (USD per capita) n/a n/a
Diamond revenues (%) n/a n/a
Mining rents (USD per capita) 0.64 0.44
Diamond reserves (USD per capita) n/a n/a
Source: Author’s elaboration based on the MINDEX database.
16 For instance, governments may be able to adjust their spending, borrow against
future revenues, draw down existing financial reserves or allow their currency to
A. Lebdioui World Development 147 (2021) 105633There are further policy implications that stem from a coun-
try’s MINDEX, particularly concerning diversification strategies.
In case 5 countries such as Chad, which is resource-dependent
but resource-poor (identifiable by a vertically stretched shape
of the MINDEX), the urgency to diversify away from extractives
is very high. This stands in contrast to countries that fit into
case 1 (both resource-rich and resource-dependent), where the
need for diversification is also high, but where diversification
around – rather than away from – extractive activities remain
a potentially attractive policy option. Indeed, the degree of
urgency – and the direction– of diversification varies not only
on a country’s degree of resource dependence but also on its
degree of resource endowment (Chang & Lebdioui, 2020). The
desirability of building linkages around a commodity by invest-
ing in upstream and downstream industries is subject to
resource exhaustibility concerns. If countries run out of oil or
copper, they might need to start import it to keep operating
related industries, which may lead to a decline in competitive-
ness (Lebdioui, 2019a, 2019b).
In contrast to the two above-mentioned cases, for countries
in cases 3 or 4, the key priority is not necessarily diversification
as much as it is the development and growth of the extractive
sector. These cases hint at possible issues of investment attrac-
tiveness in resource activities (due to a poor business climate)
or limited domestic infrastructure and capabilities to extract13minerals. In those situations, because of the potential for rev-
enue accumulation and job creation through extractive activities
(assuming the viability of resource extraction and minimal social
and environmental externalities), it can be argued that
extractives-based development should precede (or at least go
alongside) diversification.
The shape of a country’s MINDEX can therefore have important
diversification policy implications.3.3.2. Evolution over time: Longitudinal analysis
A longitudinal analysis using the MINDEX can shed light on sev-
eral phenomena, such as the degree of a country’s vulnerability to
commodity price fluctuations, the degree of its resource depen-
dence even as commodity revenues drop, the possibility of illegal
resource smuggling, or the outcomes of government efforts
towards appropriating resource revenues.3.3.2.1. Vulnerability to commodity price fluctuations and changes in
terms of economic concentration. Commodity prices have a consid-
erable impact on commodity-exporting countries. Three dates
were therefore selected to analyse the changes in various coun-
tries’ MINDEX following two shifts in commodity prices: 1997
and 2016 were marked by low commodity prices while 2010
was a year of commodity boom. Interestingly, for most coun-
tries, the 2016 ‘shape’ seems to return to its 1997 ‘shape’. Most
importantly, there is a divergence in the evolution of the ‘‘shape
of resource abundance” over time in Algeria and Nigeria on the
one hand, and in Malaysia, Chile, Norway, and the UAE on the
other hand. In times of low commodity prices, the striking dif-
ference between these countries is accentuated. In 1997 and
2016, while Malaysia, Chile, and Norway’s MINDEX shift towards
case 6 (resource-rich but diversified), Algeria’s and Nigeria’s
MINDEX shift towards case 4 (extreme dependency), which
reflects their vulnerability to commodity price fluctuations. Nor-
way, Malaysia, and Chile have relatively managed to buffer their
reliance on extractives for exports and revenues when commod-
ity prices drop.
The case of the UAE is worth singling out. In contrast to the
above-mentioned cases, the UAE has experienced a gradual and
steady diversification over the past 20 years, as shown by lower
degrees of reliance on extractives as a source of government rev-
enues and exports, thereby reducing its vulnerability to commod-
ity price fluctuations (see Fig. 4). The UAE’s MINDEX has
consequently gradually shifted from a case 1 in 2000 to a case 6
by 2016.
The MINDEX could therefore be useful to illustrate a country’s
vulnerability to commodity price fluctuations and can complement
existing methods that have such an objective. For instance, break-
even prices – that is the minimum commodity price that a
commodity-exporting country needs for its government to meet
its immediate spending needs and balance its budget – have
become popular among analysts as indicators of the economic
and political stability of commodity-exporting countries. There
are nevertheless important limits to the insights that breakeven
prices provide and relying on them narrowly may not accurately
reflect the economic constraints facing oil exporters (Clayton &
Levi, 2015).16 In contrast, the MINDEX can contribute to providing
a more comprehensive picture of the types of structural vulnerabil-
ities that given countries may be exposed to in times of commodity
price bust.depreciate (Clayton & Levi, 2015).
Fig. 4. Longitudinal analysis through the MINDEX for selected countries.18 18Data for the year 2000 was used instead of the year 1997 for the case of the UAE due to data
availability issues. EXP%: Share of extractives in total exports; EXPPC Extractives exports (in USD per capita); REVPC: Government revenues from extractives (in USD, per
capita); REV%: The share of extractives in government revenues; RENTS: Extractives rents (in USD per capita); RESRV: Extractives reserves (in USD per capita).
A. Lebdioui World Development 147 (2021) 1056333.3.2.2. Government appropriation of mining revenues. The diagnos-
tic tool also suggests that more resource revenues have accrued to
the government of DRC in 2014 than in 2010. This can be explained
by the recent efforts from the DRC government towards appropri-
ating more resource revenues, notably through a mining code revi-
sion process since 2012. This tool can thus serve to evaluate (and/
or illustrate) the impact of policies on extractives-based develop-
ment and dependence over time.4. Limitations
This section reflects on some of the limitations of the MINDEX
and how they could be address in future work. Firstly, the accuracy
and reliability of the country data have been -and will most likely
remain- important concerns. In few instances, there were discrep-
ancies across different data sources (especially regarding govern-
ment revenues and extractives reserves). Those challenges were
addressed by choosing the most plausible values based on sec-
ondary information and analyses. In addition, given the existence14of possible data discrepancies, the MINDEX’s multidimensional
method remains less prone to biases than unidimensional mea-
surements of resource wealth.
Secondly, as previously mentioned, what counts as government
revenues can be measured differently across countries. In some
countries, profits from extractive activities are retained by SOEs.
The methodological decision to leave out SOE revenues and focus
on resource revenues paid to the central government can therefore
significantly bias the government revenues measure in some coun-
tries where SOEs retain a large share of resource rents (e.g. Malay-
sia). Future updates of the MINDEX could address this issue by
collecting data on profits retained by SOEs as more information
becomes available. Similarly, another key concern is to distinguish
federal revenues from subnational revenues. In some countries
(such as the USA, the UAE, or Malaysia) resource revenues do not
only accrue to the federal government but also provincial govern-
ments. The ICTD database only includes revenues captured by the
central government. Future updates of the MINDEX could attempt
to include revenues at the subnational level too in order to provide
a more comprehensive picture of resource mobilisation dynamics.
Fig. 4 (continued)
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‘timeless’ measure of the different variables of the MINDEX by
choosing USD per capita index scores by focusing on the distribu-
tion of countries in the present time. In the long run, the role of
(some) commodities could shrink (e.g. petroleum); but at the same
time, some of them may rise in value as commodities get scarcer
and demand increases (e.g. cobalt or lithium). The way that
MINDEX is currently set up may therefore require a ‘‘smell test”
every decade or so to make sure that the values are still reasonable.
Fourthly, it is important not to oversell the ability of the MIND-
EX’s radar graphs to track on its own the impact of what are com-
plex development problems that require further qualitative
analysis. The primary intention of the MINDEX is to help detect
and raise attention to potential issues in terms of how a country
has been managing its extractives wealth, but such issues would
need to be further examined and analysed on a case-by-case basis.15As a result, rather than providing final answers, the MINDEX can
help researchers and policymakers identify areas where closer
attention is required.5. Conclusion and next steps
This study has filled an important gap in the literature in the
quest for more adequate measurements of natural resource wealth
and dependence, which is key to informing the long-standing aca-
demic interest in analyzing the impact of natural resources on
development. The research contribution of this article has been
twofold:
First, it has reviewed the limitations and implications of exist-
ing methods for measuring resource abundance and dependence.
Understanding the implications of choosing one type of natural
A. Lebdioui World Development 147 (2021) 105633resource measurement over another greatly contributes to
explaining the heterogeneity of results in the literature estimating
the impact of natural resources on economic growth, democracy,
inequality, and development more broadly. By responding to the
growing concern in the literature regarding the need to better dis-
tinguish resource abundance from resource dependence, this study
also lays the ground for future research to investigate with more
precision how different facets of resource wealth and dependence
influence development outcomes.
Second, it has provided an alternative to existing measurements
by developing a novel multidimensional indicator of resource-
based development. By building on the growing recognition of
the multidimensionality of resource wealth (Hailu & Kipgen,
2017; Le Billon & Good, 2016), the MINDEX represents a major
rethinking of natural resource measurements and constitutes the
most comprehensive database and method to evaluating resource
wealth and dependence to date. Because the six variables that it
integrates relate to the different steps of the resource revenue
management policy chain, the method used in the MINDEX holds
the potential to be used as the basis of a preliminary ‘‘diagnostic”
tool that helps identify the specific challenges of extractives-
based development faced by given countries at a given time. The
MINDEX can indeed contribute to identifying issues related to
resource exploitation, taxation, and dependence, thereby generat-
ing insights that can contribute to informing broader revenue
mobilisation dynamics, which are central to development
processes.
The scoring system of the MINDEX also enables to benchmark
countries against the performance of other countries, which can
be useful in helping to manage expectations from extractive
resource endowment and discoveries as well as adapt resource
mobilization and broader development strategies accordingly.17
For instance, recent oil discoveries have urged several African coun-
tries to design and implement local content policies and led to high
popular expectations for the future impact of petroleum on the
domestic economy (Ovadia, 2016). However, euphoria may not be
helpful, and strategies should be guided by realism (Addison &
Roe, 2018). In that context, this tool enables to carefully examine
the degree of resource abundance by country and helps to show that
extractive resource exporters such as Chad or Mali may in fact be
closer to the conditions of resource-poor East Asian countries than
resource-rich countries such as Australia, Norway or Qatar. Emulat-
ing the resource-based development model of the latter countries
may thus be misleading and out of reach. The need and type of
resource-based development and diversification strategies also
depends on a country’s ‘shape’ of resource-richness. In such a per-
spective, it is hoped that future research on the MINDEX will enable
the analysis of patterns over time and across countries to examine
the impact of different developmental models across the different
case scenarios outlined.
I am not suggesting that this alternative method is beyond crit-
icism. The accuracy and reliability of the country data have been
(and will remain) important concerns as discussed in section 4.
Nevertheless, this method is less prone to biases than unidimen-
sional measurements of resource wealth and offers a good step for-
ward towards improving resource measurements.
Other steps forward can be identified for further improving
resource wealth measurements. The MINDEX can include the gen-
eration of data with further levels of disaggregation to distinguish
different types of extracted commodities. The ability to isolate dif-
ferent types of commodities when measuring resource wealth can17 As phrased by Addison and Roe (2018:10): ‘‘The soaring architecture of the Gulf
states, built on oil wealth, captivates the modern imagination. The scale of the
potential rewards inspires explorers, miners, and investors, while politicians dream of
fast-tracks to national prosperity.”
16bear important implications for including environmental and cli-
matic considerations. For instance, it can be useful to identify the
composition of resource wealth across countries between fossil
fuels (and other commodities that are at risk of becoming stranded
assets) and so-called ‘minerals of the future’ (such as copper and
lithium), which may represent key ingredients of a low carbon
economy. To further acknowledge the urgency of climate change,
identifying ways to discount the value of resource extraction/pro-
duction/export for carbon emissions also represents an interesting
area for further research that could help improve natural resource
measurements.
Lastly, the MINDEX, its full dataset, and its future updates will
be made available online. Democratizing access to this methodol-
ogy and database (which has required over 1500 h to collect and
compile) can provide researchers across academia, civil society,
and government institutions with useful information to continue
monitoring the developmental impact of extractive resources
across countries.
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